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A large literature on “border effects” in the wake of McCallum (1995) documents the massive 
impact of borders on trade. However, all these studies suffer from an identification problem. 
“Border effects” are usually identified from cross-sectional variation alone. We do not know 
how trade would change in response to a change in borders – the “treatment effect” of borders 
on trade – simply because trade flows across “future” borders are typically not documented. 
Nor can we rule out that there is “reverse causation”: that borders run along pre-existing trade 
patterns rather than shape trade flows. We exploit a natural experiment from history to 
explore this issue: the many dramatic border changes that were imposed and codified by the 
peace treaties in 1919 across Europe. We follow Ritschl and Wolf (2008) and implement 
Ashenfelter’s difference-in-difference estimator in levels on a large, new data set on sub-
national trade flows. This allows us to trace the effects of changing borders over time and 
produces two key results: first, new borders have a large effect on trade. However second, the 
“treatment effects” of borders tend to be significantly smaller than the pure cross-sectional 
effects. This is so, because most of the 1919 border changes followed a pattern of trade 
relations across the region that was clearly visible already before 1914. Borders shape trade, 
and trade shapes borders. 
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Foundation.  I. Introduction: the dark origins of border effects 
 
Political and administrative borders have long been acknowledged to be a 
major source of trade costs that limit an efficient division of labour. “Border effects” 
are detectable both in large deviations from the law of one price (LOP) (Engel and 
Rogers 1996) as well as in gravity estimates of border-related trade costs (McCallum 
1995, Helliwell 1998) and have become a stylised fact in international economics 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000). However, we still lack a satisfactory explanation for 
these “border effects”. Especially their origins and dynamics over time are not well 
understood. Why do borders continue to matter in periods of increasing economic 
integration? It is notable that even in the careful specification of Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) the US-Canadian border is estimated to have reduced cross-border 
trade by roughly 40 per cent in 1993, four years after the introduction of a free-trade 
agreement. Moreover, recent studies on the cases of Poland’s (1918) and Germany’s 
(1990) political re-unifications indicate that the former borders that divided these 
countries continued to have a quite large trade diverting effect 15-20 years after 
unification was formally completed (Wolf 2005, Nitsch and Wolf 2008).  
 
It is not the fact that borders matter for trade, which is surprising. What is 
surprising is the extent of that impact on the one hand side and its extreme persistence 
on the other: it is very hard to make political borders disappear. This is puzzling to 
economists who are used to model “borders” in terms of tariffs, currency areas or 
similar forms of border-related barriers. The empirical evidence so far suggests that 
these factors essentially fail to capture how borders matter for trade.  
 
The literature has dealt with the first aspect: the extent of border effects in 
some detail but hardly ever considered the second: reasons for their persistence (and 
hence their origins beyond tariffs or red-tape). Apart from specification-issues notably 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), several explanations for the extent of border 
effects have been put forward. Evans (2003a) and Chaney (2005) focus on fixed costs 
of exporting and firm heterogeneity. Together these forces give rise to higher trade 
elasticity with respect to trade barriers than implied by the elasticity of substitution 
alone. However, the assumption of fixed exporting costs shifts the question of the 
  2origins of border effects to one of the origins of fixed costs for cross-border trade. 
Rossi-Hansberg (2005) and, in a similar vein, Hillberry and Hummels (2005) present 
models with intermediate and final goods, an agglomeration externality, and 
endogenous firm location. Their interaction drives endogenous changes in 
productivities, which also help to magnify the effects of tariff barriers along national 
borders. Again, the existence of trade frictions related to the border is assumed in the 
first place, while the model explains in a very elegant way a magnification of this 
effect. The origins of such border effects and hence reasons for their persistence 
remain in the dark. 
 
A simple reason why there are virtually no studies to explore the origins of 
border effects on trade is that we typically lack the necessary data to study them. And 
this is where the main contribution of our paper lies. At the heart of modern statistics 
are national statistical offices organised along the lines of political borders. Especially 
trade data used to be collected in the first place to inform policy decisions on tariffs. 
Only recent years saw an improvement in the statistical accounts of domestic, sub-
national trade flows, for example in parts of Europe, to inform regional policy. This 
plain fact gives rise to a serious identification problem, which plagues all empirical 
studies on border effects (and similar issues) so far. In an ideal setting, we would like 
to compare trade flows at time t between two regions i and j separated by a border 
with trade flows at time t between two identical regions i and j but not separated by a 
border (the control group). The difference in trade flows would equal the treatment 
effect of a border on trade. By definition we never observe identical pairs of regions at 
time t with and simultaneously without a border. Empirical studies have typically 
approximated the proper control group in a gravity model framework, where trade 
flows between different pairs at time t were compared after controlling for regional 
characteristics (GDP, Population, price levels) and some basic elements of pair-wise 
characteristics (distance, common language, etc.). In such a setting we can never rule 
out that there is some unobserved heterogeneity, not captured by the gravity model 
that essentially drives the estimated border effects. We never know, whether we 
actually estimate the treatment effect of borders on trade or the effects of some other 
factors that vary along that border, e.g. geographical features or ethno-linguistic 
networks.  
 
  3The obvious solution to such a problem would be to estimate a difference in 
difference estimator: compare the difference in the change of trade flows over time 
between two regions i and j without a treatment to that of regions k and l with a 
treatment. The first set of differences (changes over time) accounts for the otherwise 
unobservable pair-wise heterogeneity, the second accounts for the treatment (in the 
cross-section). If we would have the data, this would allow us to distinguish between 
the proper treatment-effect of changing a political or administrative border from the 
impact of unobservable pair-wise heterogeneity.  
 
On a deeper level, it might even help us to understand the origins of borders. If 
at time t pairs of regions with a future border in time t+1 trade systematically 
differently from pairs of regions never separated by a border this could indicate that 
border changes occur non-randomly but might occur in response (“endogenous”) to 
trade patterns. Why should this happen? Suppose regions are populated by a set of 
ethno-linguistic groups, irregularly scattered over all regions. At time t all groups live 
within the borders of the same state (empire), but nevertheless adherence to a group 
already shapes economic relations (trade, migration, capital flows) within that state. A 
destabilisation of the state during a war could trigger a break-up exactly along these 
pre-exiting patterns of trade. If so, an estimation of border effects in time t+1 would 
pick up the effect of these networks on trade rather than the treatment effect of the 
border. This would also help to explain the difficulties to remove border effects on 
trade because border changes often leave the structure of the population unchanged.  
 
In an important empirical contribution, Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005) 
examine the effects of business and social networks on trade and the extent to which 
they can explain border effects, drawing on an older literature that emphasizes the 
trade-creating effects of networks (especially Greif 1993, Rauch 2001, Rauch and 
Trinidade 2002). Combes et al. (2005) explore a single cross-section of French 
districts (1993) and find that administrative borders are strongly trade-diverting and, 
further, that business and social networks explain about one third of this border effect, 
and others have found similar trade effects of ethnic networks. While this suggests 
that networks indeed help to understand the origins of border effects, such evidence 
remains inconclusive for two reasons. First, even after controlling for network effects 
Combes et al. (2005) find a massive unexplained effect of borders on trade. Second, 
  4and more importantly, causation can always go either way: borders can shape 
networks and networks can shape borders. “Bavarian identity” is certainly 
strengthened by the fact that Bavaria has her own administrative structure within 
Germany. And the fact that it does so is largely owed to the existence of a “Bavarian 
identity” when Germany’s borders were shaped in 1871 or 1945/49. Unless we 
observe the imposition of new borders, we cannot explore the “treatment effect” of 
borders separate from network or other effects. And hence, without a change in 
borders we cannot make inference on the causal link between the two.  
 
The difficulty is that we usually do not observe trade flows at time t between 
two regions i and j without a border comparable to trade flows at time t+1 between 
the same regions i and j with a border, because national statistical systems tend to be 
changed along with the borders. We have some evidence on the abolition of borders 
but very little on changes in the imposition of political borders. Where we do have 
such evidence – e.g. following the break-up of Czechoslovakia or the USSR -, the 
accompanying massive changes in statistical and economic systems make an 
empirical analysis doubtful. While cross-border trade data after the border change are 
readily available, comparable cross-border trade prior to that change must be 
estimated under some arguably heroic assumptions (see Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 2003). 
What is needed is a data-set that is regionally disaggregated enough and directly 
comparable over time to track the effects of a change in political and administrative 
boundaries on regional trade flows. Based on archival sources from all parts of 
Central Europe we compiled a data-set on sub-national regional trade flows across 42 
regions of Central Europe 1885 - 1933 that enables us to estimate the treatment effect 
of the many changes in political borders on trade in the wake of the Peace conferences 
of Versailles, Trianon and St Germain in 1919. This data set covers the trade flows of 
Central Europe in the borders of the Habsburg Empire, the German Empire and those 
parts of the Russian Empire that after 1918 became part of the new Polish state for the 
six years 1885, 1910, 1913, 1925, 1926, and 1933. Moreover, rather than looking at 
aggregate trade flows, we can distinguish several key groups of traded commodities 
and analyse their trade patterns separately.  
 
In section II we briefly provide some historical background to the border 
changes in 1919, before we discuss our empirical strategy in section III. This section 
  5is split into a general discussion of how to identify the “treatment effects” of borders 
in a gravity framework (III.1) and our more specific estimation strategy (III.2). 
Section IV describes in some detail our dataset of regional trade flows across Central 
Europe 1885-1933. We present and discuss our basic empirical results in section V, 




II. Historical Background 
 
World War One had a deep impact on the European map, specifically on the 
map of Central Europe. The multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire was broken into several 
independent states, Germany lost large territories in the east, Alsace and Lorraine in 
the west and some territory in the north to Denmark. And not at least Poland was 
resurrected as a state after more than 100 years of foreign occupation. Maps 1 and 2 in 
the appendix give an idea of this geo-political shake-up. 
 
[Maps 1 and 2 about here] 
 
While in several cases the new borders were a fait accompli already in 1918, 
all changes in borders were discussed and officially codified at the Peace Conferences 
in Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon in 1919. The Peace Conference of 1919 has 
received a bad press from Keynes’s devastating critique onwards. The many dramatic 
border changes that were imposed and codified by the peace treaties are usually listed 
among the major causes for the economic difficulties of Central Europe of the 
interwar years and contrasted with a well integrated region in 1914: “The interference 
of frontiers and of tariffs was reduced to a minimum […] within the three empires of 
Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary” (Keynes 1920, p. 13). The changes of the 
European map in 1919 are regarded as responsible for the disruption of a pan-
European division of labour, which “represented a major shock to the international 
economy. It was a cause of widespread resource misallocation, resulting in lower 
output and higher prices, particularly in central and eastern Europe.” (Feinstein, 
Toniolo, Temin, 1997, p. 32).  
  6There can be little doubt that the 7,000 miles or so of new customs borders 
across Europe after 1918 did not help the economic development of Central Europe. 
Nevertheless, one can hypothesise that the new borders followed to some degree an 
already pre-existing pattern of fragmentation across the region. Data on grain prices 
suggests that the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire started some 25 years prior to 
the Great War roughly along the future borders (Schulze and Wolf 2007). Similarly, 
trade data indicates that at least for several commodity markets the Eastern (Polish-
dominated) parts of the German Reich started to integrate with the Polish parts of the 
Russian Empire already prior to 1914 (Wolf 2007, Heinemeyer 2007). If so, the 
border changes had not necessarily much adverse effect. First, in some cases the new 
borders may just have codified already existing lines of fragmentation without any 
additional real effect on trade. Second and related, if border effects on trade simply 
reflected a home bias in preferences, they did not necessarily affect welfare (Evans 
2003b).  
 
We know surprisingly little about the empirical effect of these dramatic border 
changes on the European economy. Historians that have analysed the course of the 
Paris Peace conferences might give us some hints about the factors that governed the 
negotiations about border changes. President Wilson did not intend to establish new 
borders in Central Europe, when he argued for the principle of “national self-
determination” in his famous fourteen points. For the case of Austria-Hungary, he 
rather envisaged a multinational federation within the old boundaries, supported by 
the British Government until late 1918 (see Boemeke et al. 1998, Schultz, 2002). 
Many heterogeneous aspects featured during the negotiations on new borders, such as 
historical claims, geographical and strategically considerations and especially the idea 
of ethnic homogeneity. “An ethnic principle was established for the Polish state […] 
as well as for the Italian frontiers […]. A historical principle was used to determine 
the borders between several Balkan states […]. All these were combined with 
geopolitical and economic considerations […].” (Schultz, 2002, p. 111). Hence, the 
evidence is far from conclusive, but some argue that the ethnic principle was 
dominant in large parts, mainly to the border drawing between Poland and Germany 
and Austria and Hungary (Heater 1994).  
 
  7What do we know about the effect of new borders on Europe’s economies? A 
host of contemporaneous (German or Austrian) publications in the early 1920s argues 
that the new borders dismembered previously well integrated economic areas, with 
devastating consequences for trade and production. But the only empirical study that 
makes a serious attempt to trace the effects of new borders on trade with the statistical 
tools available in the interwar years (Gaedicke and von Eynern 1933), comes to a 
surprising result: “[In] the rebuilding of European integration after the war only 
gradual dislocations occurred, which could alter in no way the fundamental 
equilibrium within European trade relationships.” (Gaedicke and von Eynern 1933, p. 
35). Did the Paris Peacemakers succeed after all in redrawing the European map in 
such a way that limited additional frictions? Did the new borders codify a pattern of 
fragmentation that was already to some extent present prior to the war along lines of 
ethno-linguistic fragmentation? Did the borders follow trade? 
 
III.1. Identifying the “treatment effect” of borders  
 
In an ideal setting, we would like to compare trade flows at time t between two 
regions i and j separated by a border with trade flows at time t between two identical 
regions i and j but not separated by a border (the control group). The difference in 
trade flows would equal the treatment effect of a border on trade. However, we never 
observe identical pairs of regions at time t with and simultaneously without a border. 
Empirical studies have typically approximated the control group in a gravity model 
framework, where trade flows between different pairs at time t were compared after 
controlling for regional characteristics (GDP, Population, price levels) and some basic 
elements of pair-wise characteristics (distance, common language, etc.). In such a 
setting we can never rule out that there is some unobserved heterogeneity, not 
captured by the gravity model that essentially drives the estimated border effects. We 
never know, whether we actually estimate the treatment effect of borders on trade or 
the effects of some other factors that just happen to vary along that border.  
 
Here we will estimate the treatment effect of borders on trade with a difference 
in difference estimator in levels, as suggested by Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter 
and Card (1985). We follow the notation in Ritschl and Wolf (2008) who recently 
  8applied this to a gravity framework. Denote by   and  , respectively, the trade 
volume between two regions in the presence (1) or absence (0) of a political or 
administrative border. The individual treatment effect of a border is the difference in 
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By construction, this treatment effect   rests on an unobserved counterfactual: 
, the trading volume with a border and  , the trading volume in the absence of 
a border, cannot be observed at the same time. This problem would be minor if 
treatment had identical effects on all individual pairs, see e.g. Blundell and Costa 
Dias, (2002). However, with unobserved heterogeneity, stronger assumptions are 
required. We are interested in the expectation of  for those pairs of regions 
actually being separated by a border. This gives rise to the counterfactual Average 
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Estimation of the treatment effect on the treated in a panel involves imposing 
identifying assumptions about this counterfactual. The literature on treatment effects 
in labor econometrics, e.g. Heckman et al., (1999), lists a large array of possible 
options and their respective pitfalls. 
 
In the framework of a gravity equation (for example Anderson and van Wincoop 
2003), assume a data-generating process (DGP) for trade that nests the alternatives 
discussed so far. Let   be the trade flows among pairs of regions that are 
separated by a border at time h during the observation period T. Let  be the trade 
flows among those pairs of regions not separated by a border and can be regarded as 
the reference group. Then, a DGP capturing the essentials of the problem is: 
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The residuals might or might not be correlated serially or with the RHS variables. If 
the fixed effects are zero, the estimator collapses into the pooled OLS or “between” 
estimator. OLS estimation of (1) assuming zero country-pair fixed effects is only 
unbiased if there is random selection into the treatment, i.e. if separation by a border 
at time h is not affected by prior levels of economic interaction. In other words, 
pooled OLS requires the absence of endogeneity. This implies that for the countries 
under treatment, the estimated residuals   in (1) must be serially uncorrelated 
even if the individual fixed effects are constrained to be zero. Estimation with nonzero 
country pair fixed effects   yields unbiased estimates of the treatment 
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that is, if no relation exists between the expected residuals under any currency 
arrangement and the decision to participate. This holds if all expected individual 
variation of trade volumes around their state-dependent means is fully captured by the 
fixed effect. Then, no additional self-selection into trade regimes is present. This is 
the standard set of identifying assumptions with fixed effects estimation.  
 
Including region-specific characteristics in the gravity equation, as suggested 
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), obviously just adds dimensions to matrix X. 
Otherwise, it is still a version of the pooled OLS estimator, with a richer set of 
characteristics X but only unbiased under random selection into the treatment. To 
  10overcome the problem of missing fixed effects in the gravity equation, the expected or 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) could be obtained by taking first 
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This difference-in-differences estimator is an unbiased estimator of the ATT if both 
groups followed a common trend (d = 0 in eq. 2). Assumptions about counterfactual 
common trends are crucial in panel studies and methods have been proposed to infer 
the divergent trend parameter d from other subperiods of T, see Blundell and Costa 
Dias (2002). However, differencing is only feasible if sufficiently many observations 
along the time dimension of the panel are available; a condition that often (and in our 
case) is not given. In the context of the gravity equation, it has two additional 
disadvantages. First, it washes out all time-invariant coefficients of interest like the 
ones on distance, just as a region pair fixed effect would do. Second, while it does 
capture the treatment effect properly, it eliminates the available evidence for the 
sources of possible selection-bias.  
 
An alternative approach, which avoids killing the gravity equation while 
estimating it, is to spell out the estimator in levels. The difference in differences 
estimator in levels, introduced by Ashenfelter (1978), Ashenfelter and Card (1985), 
defines a fixed effect for the treated (FET).
6 In our context, it is equal to unity for all 
region pairs separated by a border (the treatment) at some point in time, such that for 
all region pairs ij separated by border m at time h > 1 we have 
 
                                                 
6 We are grateful to Albrecht Ritschl for suggesting this approach.  
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For the trade flows pertaining to regions separated by border m, this fixed effect for 
the treated,   measures the average deviation from the sample mean of trade 
volumes when the border is not in place. In our sample, most borders are imposed but 
not removed during the sample. In those cases, the FET is a measure of the path 
dependence in the formation of borders that we are after. The specification to be 
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where  is the fixed effect for border m, while  is the treatment effect 
dummy for the border at time h. X captures any (possible time-dependent) common 
characteristics, while h is the common trend. In eq. (3), the coefficients   on the 
country group dummy measure the pre-existing common characteristics of a group of 





m γ  
measures the treatment effect of the respective border itself.  
 
Hence, in the absence of anticipation effects, we are able to estimate both, the effect 
of selection bias (or endogeneity) and possible treatment effects. Anticipation effects 
are known to labour econometricians as Ashenfelter’s dip, introducing time variation, 
and hence bias, into the fixed effect. It would be far fetched to argue that there were 
anticipation effects in our natural experiment of the First World War, which ensures 
unbiasedness.  
 
III.2. Empirical strategy: history, logs and zeros  
 
We implement this idea within the framework of the now standard micro-
founded formulation of a gravity model on trade flows from Anderson and van 
  12Wincoop (2003, and 2004), modified for our historical data. Following their 
approach, at any time t exports X from region i to j in a certain period can be 
explained by the relative economic size of the exporter and the importer, expressed as 
the proportion of the product of the exporter's income Y and the importer's 
expenditure E in overall income. Additionally, X depends on the bilateral resistance to 
trade (trade costs denoted “t”) relative to the overall barriers to trade of the respective 
trading partners, i.e. the inward “multilateral resistance” P and the outward 
“multilateral resistance” Π. The elasticity of substitution between varieties of k from 
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None of the variables displayed in (4) is directly observable to us. However, as all 
these variables are region-specific, but not pair-specific, it is still possible to 
consistently estimate the average effect of trade costs on trade in (4) by introducing 
two sets of time-varying dummies for each region Ai,t and Aj,t (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2004, p.27). These dummy variables are equal to one once a region enters 
the equation as an importer or exporter, respectively. Furthermore, the model requires 
trade flows in values whereas our sample comprises information on physical 
quantities. Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) we assume trade costs 
to be proportional in trade values so that we are dealing with , where Z
k
ij 
is the volume of exports in metric tons. We may substitute X, since Zij
k denotes the 
observed quantities shipped from i to j and the term pi
k is exporter-specific and thus 
reflected by the respective (time-varying) exporter dummy. Therefore, we replace the 
unknown terms in (4) as described above by time-varying importer (Ai
k) and exporter 
(Aj
k) effects and add an i.i.d. error term yielding (again dropping the time index t) 





















σ − = ) ( ,          ( 5 )  
 
where the importer and exporter specific dummies capture all undirected region-
specific heterogeneity, including price effects, multilateral resistance, region-specific 
  13infrastructure and the like. The variable t
k
ij denotes bilateral trade barriers, which is 
the main focus of our study.  
 
To explore these barriers, we have to make some assumptions about the 
functional form of t
k
ij. We assume that costs are incurred (i) by transporting goods 
over distance, which we proxy by a linear function of geographical distances dist, (ii) 
when crossing existing political borders as well as (iii) when crossing prospective or 
former political borders. We are agnostic about the origins of the latter, but they 
would capture all factors that systematically affect the trade intensity between the 
relevant region pairs, including existing ethno-linguistic or business networks. Our 
estimation must therefore account for possible border effects present both before and 
after the war as well as border effects that were present only before or only after 
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where D_prw is a dummy equal to ‘one’ if regions i and j did not belong to the 
same state prior to WWI, otherwise it is equal to ‘zero’. The post-war equivalent is 
D_pow, which equals ‘one’ if regions i and j did not belong to the same state after 
WWI. A negative and significant coefficient of these variables reflects a trade 
diverting border effect, meaning that ceteris paribus regions traded less if they were 
located on different sides of national borders. Note that this is the standard procedure 
to estimate border effects in a cross-section. We estimate this for illustrative purposes 
only, but it does not yet implement the Ashenfelter-type difference-in-difference 
estimator.  
In a second step, we implement the difference-in-difference estimator in levels 
by decomposing the post-war border effect into three components: the continuing 
effect of those borders on post-war trade that existed already prior to the war (D_old), 
the effect of new borders on post-war trade (D_new), and the fixed effect of all factors 
that affected the trade intensity between the relevant region pairs along the lines of 
these new borders, but independent from the time of their formal codification 
(new_FET).  
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This implements the basic idea of Ashenfelter as spelled out in section III.1 
above: the specification allows us to assess the “treatment effect” of the new political 
borders as established by the 1919 peace treaties on regional trade, controlling for 
time-invariant pair-wise heterogeneity along these lines. We compare the difference 
in the change of trade flows over time between two regions i and j without a treatment 
(no border before nor after WWI) to that of regions k and l with a treatment (no 
border before but a border after WWI) – controlling for possible changes in regional 
characteristics over time and controlling for the differences in pair-wise distance. The 
first set of differences (over time) accounts for the otherwise unobservable pair-wise 
heterogeneity, the second for the treatment (in the cross-section). Hence, we can 
distinguish between the proper treatment-effect of changing a political or 
administrative border from the impact of unobservable pair-wise heterogeneity. More 
specifically, we can distinguish the following four cases: 
 
. effect    treatment some    , endogenous partly  Border    New 0 , 0
, effect    treatment no    , endogenous entirely  Border    New 0 , 0
effect,    treatment full   has Border    New   0 , 0



















The standard approach is to substitute (6) into (4) or (5), and to log-linearise 
the gravity equation to estimate the model with OLS or a system estimator. In a recent 
contribution, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) caution that this approach leads to 
biased estimates unless very specific assumptions are met. The basic difficulty is that 
the expected value of a log-transformed random variable does not only depend on the 
mean of the random variable but also on its higher moments.
7  Given this, 
heteroskedasticity of the error term in the stochastic formulation of the model would 
result in an inefficient, biased and inconsistent estimator.
8 Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) demonstrate the magnitude of this inconsistency and strongly recommend 
                                                 
7 This is known as Jensen's inequality stating that E(ln(y)) ≠ ln(E(y)), with y being a random variable. 
8 In fact, in the application of gravity models the resulting estimation errors display very often 
heteroskedasticity (e.g. Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006, but also Heinemeyer 2007 analyzing a subset 
of our data). 
  15estimating the gravity model in its multiplicative form to avoid this problem. An 
appealing side effect of this strategy is that one circumvents as well the problem of 
zero observations of the dependent variable, which arises by linearizing equation (5), 
since the log of zero is not defined.
9 Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose a 
Poisson maximum-likelihood (PML) estimator, since it is “consistent and reasonably 
efficient under a wide range of heteroskedasticity patterns [...]” (p.645).
10 For the 
PML, it is sufficient to assume that the conditional mean of a dependent variable is 
proportional to its conditional variance. This estimator is preferable to others without 
further information on the heteroskedasticity according to Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006, p.645). It attributes the same informative weight to all observations. Moreover, 
the estimator in is numerically equal to the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
(PPML) estimator, which is used for count data models. In order to gain efficiency, it 
is possible to correct for heteroskedasticity using a robust covariance matrix estimator 





                                                 
9 The appearance of zero observations may be due to mistakes or thresholds in reporting trade, but 
bilateral trade can actually be zero. This event is particularly frequent if one investigates trade flows at 
a regional and/or sectoral level. The occurrence of zero trade is usually correlated with the covariates.     
10 They present the results of a horse race between various estimation strategies including Tobit, non-
linear least squares and Poisson regression models. Investigating simulated and real trade data, they 
conclude that only the latter approach and NLS deliver consistent estimates, but that NLS is less 
efficient because the structure of heteroskedasticity is unknown.  
11 Not as much as a robustness check but in order to link our findings to the literature, we repeated the 
results obtained from PPML by results from conventional Tobit and scaled OLS estimation. This 
changed some of the coefficients but left our findings qualitatively unchanged.  
 
  16IV. A new data-set on Central Europe’s regional trade flows, 1885-1933 
 
We have compiled a large new data-set that comprises exports of 42 Central 
European regions before and after WWI, a total of about 50,000 observations. The 
data-set covers six years, namely three years (1885, 1910 and 1913) before and three 
years (1925, 1926, and 1933) after WWI. All border changes in our sample occurred 
around 1919, which is after 1913 and before 1925. Due to the chaotic political (war, 
revolution) and economic (hyperinflation) circumstances, data for the period 1914 - 
1924 was unavailable. We examine railway shipments (approximately 80% of total 
trade) of seven commodity groups which represent different sectors of the economy: 
rye – an important agricultural product –, brown coal and hard coal – natural 
resources used for power generation in the industry and for heating in the private 
sector – as well as coke, which is a key input factor to the iron and steel industry. 
Furthermore, the data-set covers three groups of processed industrial products: iron 
and steel (semi-) manufactures, cardboard and paper-products, and finally chemical 
products. 
 
The main sources of data are two publication series published annually by the 
German authorities. Up until 1909 the Königlich Preußische Ministerium der 
öffentlichen Arbeiten (Royal Prussian Ministry of Public Works) and thereafter the 
Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (Imperial Statistical Office) published the Statistik der 
Güterbewegung auf Deutschen Eisenbahnen (Statistics of the Movement of Goods on 
German Railways). After WWI, their successor, the Statistisches Reichsamt (German 
Statistical Office), continued the series nearly unchanged until 1925. Thereafter, the 
Reichsamt introduced some minor changes and renamed the series into Die 
Güterbewegung auf Deutschen Eisenbahnen (Movement of Goods on German 
Railways). These series document shipments on railways between all parts of 
Germany in the borders of 1914 - split into 27 trade districts (TD) - and shipments 
between them and all their European neighbouring regions. With some necessary 
aggregations this gives a total of 42 Central Europe trade districts. Table 1 gives a 
complete list of these regions and Map 3 shows their location.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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[Maps 3 about here] 
 
All data is given in metric tons. Shipments of less than 0.5 tons were 
neglected. For the German TDs we have internal (that is intra-district) shipments as 
well as data on export and import shipments for each TD into, respectively from all 
the remaining 41 TDs. There are three notable features of these German statistics. 
First, the sources provide data at the sub-state level for both Germany and her 
neighbours, for example Austria-Hungary is split into four regions: Galicia, Bohemia, 
Hungary, and German Austria (including Moravia). Importantly, shipments from and 
into the Kingdom of Poland are also reported separately from those of the Russian 
Empire. Second, the geographical definition of German and foreign TD prior to the 
war forestalls very closely the demarcation of new countries after WWI. Third, and 
related to the second, the German authorities largely kept up the geographical 
definition of previously German TDs after WWI. This is a very remarkable feature of 
the data-set. For example, the Republic of Poland after WWI was split into “East 
Poland” (the former Russian part), “West Poland” (the former German part except 
Upper Silesia), “East Upper Silesia”, and “Galicia” (the former Austrian part). 
Similarly, shipments from and into Alsace-Lorraine were reported separately from 
those of France. These unique features allow us to trace the regional trade flows 
across Central Europe over the whole period 1885-1933, over the massive changes in 
political borders.  
 
Together, the German statistical sources provide about 90 per cent of the 
almost 50,000 observations contained in our sample, where we use the information on 
imports by German TD as export flows from the foreign regions to Germany. To 
complete the data-set we had to gather only the missing data on the internal trade of 
non-German trade districts and data on export shipments between non-German 
districts. For the pre-war period, we had to complete trade flows for the Russian part 
of Poland and the different regions of Austria-Hungary. For pre-war Poland we used 
the railway and customs data compiled by Henryk Tennenbaum (1916) in his Bilans 
Handlowy Królestwa Polskiego (The Trade Balance of the Kingdom of Poland). 
Although efforts towards a “national statistic” were undertaken in various parts of 
Austria-Hungary, only Hungary produced usable trade statistics. Here we used mainly 
  18A Magyar Szent Korona Országainak 1882-1913. Évi Külkereskedelmi Forgamla 
(Foreign Trade of the Lands of the Holy Hungarian Crown, 1882-1913) – a foreign 
trade statistics based on railway shipments. Data on Cisleithania are more 
problematic. First, only the private railway companies report transports at a regional 
level, whereas the state railways report only figures for entire Cisleithania, their share 
in transports being above 50% in all product categories. Second and more severe, the 
source does not clearly enough separate imports of one railway from the other, thus 
shipments are likely to be counted several times once transported by more than one 
company. As far as trade in brown coals, hard coals, and coke is concerned, the 
Austrian Bergbaustatistik (mining statistics) serve as a good substitute. They do not 
only report production data at a regional level but also sales of regions to other 
regions within Cisleithania and abroad.  
 
For the post-war period, the compilation of data is much simpler as we can 
rely on the statistical administrations which were quickly set-up in all of the newly 
formed independent states in Central Europe. Hence, we used the official commodity-
specific trade statistics of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and the statistics 
of the department Haute Rhine. For the few cases where we lacked any information 
on internal trade, we relied on the approach to proxy internal trade by subtracting 
exports from production as applied by Wei (1996). In some very rare cases, where the 
above was not feasible, we used circumstantial evidence normally on the absence of 
certain trade relations, given the sources could be regarded as reliable. Where neither 
of these approaches was feasible or sensible, observations are missing, indicated by 
“NA”. To assure that these last cases do not affect our interpretation of the data, all 
reported estimates refer to the balanced samples with full information at all points in 
time.  
 
  19V. Basic Results: the treatment effect of new borders on trade (are small) 
 
  We start our analysis by estimating the average effects of borders on trade, 
prior to WWI and after WWI in the framework outlined in section III, equation (6). 
We estimate the model with PPML for each product class separately and limit 
attention to the balanced sample only. Table 2 gives the results. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In general, the fit of the model is excellent. Both, distance and the border dummies 
come with the expected negative coefficients and are highly significant in all cases, 
after controlling for time-varying importer and exporter effects as suggested by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Whatever assumptions are made about the 
elasticity of substitution, the average effects of national borders on trade between 
regions was large both before and after WWI. For simplicity we will follow most of 
the empirical literature and assume that the elasticity of substitution can vary across 
product-classes but is stable over time. Given this, the average border effects for 
various kind of coal were (significantly) larger after the war than before. And this is 
what we would have expected. However, the opposite holds for other products-
classes: the average border effect for iron and steel products, chemical products, and 
paper are all smaller after 1919 than before, while those for rye are virtually 
unchanged.  
 
Before we explore reasons for these changes over time, note that the number 
of borders has increased over time. While prior to the war about 7% of all trade flows 
in our sample crossed a border, it was roughly 10% after the war (see table 3). 
Therefore, a slight decline in the average border effect as for paper or rye should not 
be misinterpreted as evidence for better overall integration. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
What explains the changes over time? To start with the most obvious reason 
for an increase in border effects: the interwar period saw a large rise in tariffs and 
  20quotas across all products and on nearly all state borders already during the 1920s, but 
especially after 1929 in reaction to the great depression. The best source of 
comparable tariff data across European states is Liepmann (1938), who collected data 
for 1913, 1927 and 1933 for Germany, Habsburg and successor states, the Russian 
Empire and Poland (after 1918). Figures 1-4 reproduce the relevant data for our 
sample products: except for trade across the borders of the newly established Polish 
state tariffs generally increased after the war during the 1920s and then again sharply 
until 1933.  
 
[Figures 1-4 about here] 
 
Moreover, our estimated border effects should reflect not only tariffs along borders 
but also the impact of quotas, or exchange control systems that were imposed on 
cross-border trade during the great depression. To illustrate this point note that the 
border effects estimated in the Anderson and van Wincoop-framework can be easily 
converted into tariff-equivalents as exp(δ/-σ
k)-1 (see equation 5). If we take the 
estimated product-group specific elasticities of substitutions from Evans (2003b), the 
estimated tariff-equivalent of the average “pre-war border” on trade in Hard Coal after 
the war would be 90%, that of the “post-war borders” 150%, for iron and steel (semi-) 
manufactures 670% and 322%, for chemicals 137% and 81%, for paper and related 
products 161% and 156%, and for rye 155% and 151% respectively. Compared to 
figures 1-4 these estimates strongly suggest that tariffs are only part of the story. 
 
Next, we can decompose the post-war borders into “old borders” that existed 
already before 1914 and “new borders” that were drawn after the war. Were the new 
borders indeed excessively trade-diverting, i.e. more trade diverting than the “old 
borders”, dismembering Central Europe as argued by the losers of the war? Or were 
instead the Peace-makers in Versailles, St.Germain and Trianon successful in 
redrawing the European map such as to minimize additional frictions? In table 4, we 
repeated the analysis of border effects but distinguished between the effects of new 
and old borders after the war (as in equation 7 but still without the FET).  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
  21  The trade diverting effect of new borders on trade is visible, and it is 
significant. But the effect of new borders is always below that of the old borders. This 
can be interpreted as another hint that borders did not change randomly at all, but 
tended to follow some existing structures. This brings us now to our main question: to 
what extent do our estimates capture the effects of borders in the sense of codified 
political institutions? And to what extent do they actually capture some other 
underlying trade frictions that simply tend to run along the same lines? We can 
explore this question with regard to the new borders. To this end we implement 
equation (7), the difference in difference estimator in levels, that allows us to 
distinguish the genuine treatment effect of the news borders (active from 1919 
onwards) from a pair-wise fixed effect on the treated (FET), active over all periods. 
Table 5 shows the result. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The data clearly support the idea that the border changes did not occur 
randomly but followed an already existing pattern of fragmentation, visible before 
1914: the new border fixed effects (FET) are always negative and highly significant. 
After controlling for this effect, we find that the treatment effect of new borders is 
much smaller than the naïve cross-sectional estimates of tables 2-4 suggested. For 
example, if we again use the estimates from Evans (2003b) for the elasticity of 
substitution, the tariff equivalent of the implied tariff-equivalent of the treatment 
effect of new borders on trade in hard coal is 81% (instead of 137% as suggested by 
table 4), that for iron and steel (semi-) manufactures 204% (instead of 249%) and for 
rye zero (or not statistically significantly different from zero, instead of 130%). The 
difference between the two gives the tariff equivalents of time-invariant barriers to 
trade that run along the new borders and this difference is in most cases quite 
considerable.  
 
Given that the new borders codified at Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon 
were (and still are) considered extreme cases of political barriers to trade, we 
conclude that our results can be generalized: the effects of political borders on trade as 
identified from cross-sectional evidence alone tend to be significantly biased upwards 
and need to be very carefully interpreted. The borders as such, codified and 
  22accompanied by tariffs, quotas or red-tape, have a much more limited effect on trade 
than often suggested. Borders tend to run along other structures that considerably 
magnify their effect, but may have existed prior to the borders and may well persist 
when the border is gone.  
 
So, what caused these intriguing “borders before the border”: what factors 
separated West Prussia, Pomerania, Upper Silesia, Alsace-Lorraine from the rest of 
the German Empire prior to 1914? What factors account for this effect across the 
monetary and customs union of the Habsburg Empire prior to 1914?  
 
VI. Digging deeper: ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and the “border before 
a border” 
 
We limit our attention in this paper to a prime suspect for the “border before a 
border” effects documented in table 5: ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, or better formal 
or informal institutions that developed along ethno-linguistic lines may have affected 
regional trade flows across Central Europe prior to 1914. Recent qualitative work by 
historians on the prevalence of intra-state economic nationalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe suggests that ethnically-based institutions increasingly affected 
trading costs between different ethnic groups by systematically directing trade 
towards the own group and putting a cost on trade with others (Jaworski 2004, Lorenz 
2006). For example Jaworski’s (2004) research on boycott movements between 
different ethnic groups within the multi-national setting of East Central Europe points 
to ethnic mobilization as a key element of intra-state economic nationalism at work 
prior to 1914. ‘Self-integrating national communities’ (Bruckmüller and Sandgruber) 
ventured to keep ‘others’ out, via boycotts and the threat to boycott. We also see the 
emergence of ethnically oriented trade institutions within the German an the 
Habsburg Empire prior to 1914, especially cooperatives. ‘Through national 
segregation on the regional, and, increasingly, on the local level, cooperatives evolved 
from socially organized and a-national, into inter-societal, nationally organized 
institutions’ (Lorenz, 2006: 22) during a phase of ‘ethnic segregation’ (broadly, in the 
1860s and ‘70s). This was followed by a phase of ‘ethnic mobilization’, much in line 
  23with intensifying national conflicts within the old Empires during the late 19
th century 
up to World War One.  
 
Hence, did these ethno-linguistic institutions indeed create barriers to regional 
trade flows, visible before the actual creation of borders along their lines? And can 
they account for the observed “borders before the border” (as visible in the FET)? To 
explore this question we used language statistics, which are available for all our 
regions in 1910. Denote by ai
k the share of people that declare in the statistic language 
k as their mother tongue in region i. Similar to a Herfindahl-index we can then 










k ij a a
n
Language − Σ =
= ,         ( 8 )    
 
The index takes on values between 0 and 1. An index value of 0 would reflect a pair 
of regions that has identical shares in each language group; an index value close to 1 
would reflect a pair of regions with no overlap in languages spoken. If indeed ethno-
linguistic institutions created barriers to regional trade already prior to 1914, such an 
index should help to capture them. Can this explain the “border before a border”? 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
There is indeed evidence that ethno-linguistic institutions had a strong trade 
diverting effect both before and after 1919, with a lot of variation across product-
classes. Except for hard coal and chemical products we find evidence that ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity affected trade flows. In some cases the effect is quite massive. 
Except for the various coal products the index also helps to explain the new border 
FET estimated above. For iron and steel (semi-) manufactures the index essentially 
explains the “border before a border”, for paper it explains about halve of the effect. 
We conclude that the geography of ethno-linguistic groups has an important effect on 
the geography of trade costs, while we know arguable little about the underlying 
mechanisms at work. Networks matter in themselves (see Rauch 2001 or Combes et 
al. 2005), but they can have much deeper effects on trade costs via their impact on 
institutions and the geography of borders. 
  24VII. Conclusion 
 
Virtually all studies on “border effects” in the wake of McCallum (1995) 
suffer from an identification problem: “border effects” are identified from cross-
sectional variation alone. We do not know how trade would change in response to a 
change in borders – the “treatment effect” of borders – simply because trade flows 
across “future” borders are typically not documented. Nor can we rule out that that 
there is “reverse causation”: that borders follow pre-existing trade patterns rather than 
shape trade flows. Here we exploited a natural experiment from history to explore this 
issue, namely the dramatic border changes that were imposed and codified by the 
peace treaties in 1919 across Europe. We compiled a large, new data set on sub-
national trade flows, which allowed us to trace the effects of changing borders over 
time. Crucially, it allowed us to implement a difference-in-difference estimator 
similar to Ashenfelter (1978), where we distinguish the genuine treatment effect of 
new borders (active from 1919 onwards) from a pair-wise fixed effect on the treated 
(FET). This produced two key results: first, new borders create new barriers to trade. 
But second, the “treatment effects” of borders tend to be much smaller than the pure 
cross-sectional effects, because most of the 1919 border changes followed a pattern of 
trade relations across the region that was clearly visible already before 1914. Given 
that the new borders codified at Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon are often 
considered extreme cases of political barriers to trade, we conclude that our results 
can be generalized: the effects of political borders on trade as identified from cross-
sectional evidence alone tend to be significantly biased upwards. At least, we need to 
interpret such empirical findings very carefully. The borders as such, accompanied by 
tariffs or quotas, have a much more limited effect on trade than often suggested. It is 
some other, deeper structures that run along the borders and considerably magnify 
their effect. These structures may have existed prior to the borders and may well 
persist when the border is gone. We showed that ethno-linguistic heterogeneity had a 
strong trade diverting effect both before and after 1919, which helps to explain the 
estimated “border before a border” effects (FET). However, more research is needed 
to understand the mechanisms at work. Ethnic heterogeneity matters as such, but can 
have much deeper effects on trade costs via formal and informal institutions, 
including borders. Borders shape trade, and trade shapes borders. 
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  28Table 1: List of Regions in Our Data Set, 1885-1933 
 
East Prussia  Bavarian Palatine (excl. 
Ludwigshafen) 
West Prussia  Hesse (excl. Oberhessen) 
Pomerania Baden 
Mecklenburg  Württemberg, Hohenzollern 




Upper Silesia  Russia 
Lower Silesia  Kingdom of Poland 
Berlin Galicia,  Bukovina 
Brandenburg Romania 
Anhalt und Magdeburg  Hungary, Slavonia, Croatia, Bosnia 
Thuringia and the administrative 
districts of Merseburg and Erfurt 
Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece 
Saxony and Leipzig  Bohemia and Austria 
Hesse-Nassau, Upper Hesse Switzerland 
Ruhr bassin (Westfalia)  Italy 
Ruhr bassin (Rhine province)  France 
Westfalia, Lippe (and Waldeck) Luxemburg 
Rhine province right of the river 
Rhine 
Belgium 
Rhine province left of the river 
Rhine and Cologne 
Netherlands 
Saar Great  Britain 
Alsace-Lorraine Sweden,  Norway 
 
  29Table 2: Average Border Effects before and after WW1 (PPML, balanced 
sample, robust SE) 






Chemicals Paper  etc.  Rye 
Distance  -2.33***  -1.78***   -2.49***   -1.27*** -1.25*** -1.21***    -2.97*** 
Pre-war 
Border 
-1.74**   -1.52**   -0.96***   -4.21***   -3.48***  -3.73**   -4.33***  
Post-war 
Border 
-2.46**   -3.26***  -2.32***   -2.95** -2.40** -3.66**  -4.27*** 
Imp, Exp 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#  of  Obs.  7724 7882 7762 7675  7423  7482 7528 
Adj  R2  0.92 0.87 0.86 0.85  0.74  0.87 0.89 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. 
  30Table 3: the number of bilateral trade flows that cross borders 
 HC  Coke  BC  IronSteel  Chem  Paper  Rye 
 
Total 7724 7882 7762 7675 7423 7482 7528 
Pre-war  571 576 580 569 487 542 542 
Post-war  764 767 770 756 678 739 731 
Old 561 566 570 559 487 542 534 
New 203 201 200 197 191 197 197 
New  BFE  203 201 200 197 191 197 197 
 
Table 4: Average Border Effects before and after WW1, old and new 
borders (PPML, balanced sample, robust SE) 






Chemicals Paper  etc.  Rye 
Distance  -2.33***   -1.76***   -2.49***   -1.26***   -1.25***  -1.20***  -2.96*** 
Pre-war 
Border 
-1.74** -1.54***    -0.95** -4.22***   -3.48***  -3.73***  -4.34***  
Old 
Border 
-3.20**   -4.35** 
 





-2.33***   -2.82**  -3.24**   -2.56** -2.46** -2.72**    -3.87** 
Imp, Exp 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#  of  Obs.  7724 7882 7762 7675  7423  7482 7528 
Adj  R2  0.92 0.88 0.86 0.85  0.74  0.88 0.89 
 
  31Table 5: The Treatment effects of New Borders on Trade (PPML, 
balanced sample, robust SE) 






Chemicals Paper  etc.  Rye 
Distance  -2.27***   -1.72***   -2.44***  -1.25*** -1.24*** -1.20***  -2.70*** 
Pre-war 
Border 
-2.02** -2.81***    -1.29** -4.39*** -3.60*** -3.83***  -5.74*** 
Old Border  -3.22**   -4.40** 
 









-1.60**  -1.25** -0.39 -2.28** -1.82** -2.42** -1.35 
Imp, Exp 
Effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
#  of  Obs.  7724  7882  7762  7675 7423 7482  7528 















  32Table 6: Endogenous Border Changes? Ethno-Linguistic Heterogeneity 









Chemicals Paper  etc.  Rye 
Distance  -2.27*** -1.71*** -2.44*** -1.25*** -1.24*** -1.20***  -2.68*** 
Pre-war 
Border 
-2.03** -2.73** -0.95**  -4.50*** -3.54***  -3.70** -5.97** 
Old 
Border 
-3.22** -4.27** -1.24** -3.68**  -2.25**  -4.06** -4.49** 
New 
Border FE 




-1.59** -1.24**  0.29  -2.47**  -1.83**  -2.42**  -1.19 
Language  0.11 -1.03*  -3.12**  -1.32** -0.38  -2.05**  -2.77** 
Imp, Exp 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
#  of  Obs.  7724 7882 7762 7675  7423  7482 7528 
Adj R2  0.93  0.89  0.87  0.86  0.74  0.88  0.97 
  33Figures 1-4: average tariff levels across Central Europe, 1913, 1927, 1933 
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